Donella H. Meadows, Edited by Diana Wright, Thinking in systems [ ]
p.103
Jay Forrester used to tell us, when we were modeling a construction or processing delay, to ask everyone in the system how long they thought the delay was, make our best guess, and then multiply by three. (That correction factor also works perfectly, I have found, for estimating how long it will take to write a book!)
p.104
Here are just a few of the delays we have found important in include in various models we have made:
• The delay between catching an infectious disease and getting sick enough to be diagnosed──days to years, depending on the disease.
• The delay between pollution emission and the diffusion or percolation or concentration of the pollutant in the ecosystem to the point at which it does harm.
• The gestation and maturation delay in building up breeding populations of animals or plants, causing the characteristic oscillations of commodity prices: 4-year cycles for pigs, 7 years for cows, 11 years for cocoa trees.8
• The delay in changing the social norms for desirable family size──at least one generation.
• The delay in retooling a production stream and the delay in turning over a capital stock. It takes 3 to 8 years to design a new car and bring it to the market. That model may have 5 years of life on the new-car market. Cars stay on the road an average of 10 to 15 years.
p.187
Appendix
System Definitions: A Glossary
(selected list, for the complete list, see book)
Archetypes: common system structures that produce characteristic patterns of behaviour.
Bounded rationality: the logic that leads to decisions or actions that make sense within one part of a system but are not reasonable within a broader context or when seen as a part of the wider system.
p.188
System: a set of elements or parts that is coherently organized and inter-connected in a pattern or structure that produces a characteristic set of behaviour, often classified as its “function” or “purpose.”
(Thinking in systems : a primer, Donella H. Meadows, Edited by Diana Wright, sustainability institute, 2008, QA 402 .M425 2008, )
____________________________________
pregnancy : 9 month to give birth to a baby
____________________________________
• One notable challenge for the hardware tower is that it takes four to five years [4 to 5 years] to design and build chips and to port software to evaluate them. {“A view of the parallel computing landscape” by Krste Asanovic, Rastislav Bodík, James Demmel, Tony Keaveny, Kurt Keutzer, John Kubiatowicz, Nelson Morgan, David Patterson, Koushik Sen, John Wawrzynek, David Wessel, and Katherine Yelick in the Communications of the ACM, Volume 52, Issue 10, pages 56-67, October 2009.}
• A second challenge is that two critical pieces of system software—compilers and operating systems—have grown large and unwieldy and hence resistant to change. One estimate is that it takes a decade [10-years] for a new compiler optimization to become part of production compilers. {“A view of the parallel computing landscape” by Krste Asanovic, Rastislav Bodík, James Demmel, Tony Keaveny, Kurt Keutzer, John Kubiatowicz, Nelson Morgan, David Patterson, Koushik Sen, John Wawrzynek, David Wessel, and Katherine Yelick in the Communications of the ACM, Volume 52, Issue 10, pages 56-67, October 2009.}
• Landscape of Parallel Computing Research: a view from Berkeley
• December 18, 2006
• Power is expensive. We can put more transistors on a chip than we have the power to turn on.
• The doubling of uniprocessor performance may now take 5 years.
• As chips drop below 65 nm feature sizes, they will have high soft and hard error rates. [Borkar 2005][Mukherjee et al 2005]
source:
A View of the Parallel Computing Landscape
Krste Asanovic, Rastislav Bodík, James Demmel, Tony Keaveny, Kurt Keutzer,
John Kubiatowicz, Nelson Morgan, David Patterson, Koushik Sen,
John Wawrzynek, David Wessel, and Katherine Yelick
© 2010
The landscape of parallel computing research : view from berkeley
Krste Asanovic
Ras Bodik
Bryan Christopher Catanzaro
Joseph James Gebis
Parry Husbands
Kurt Keutzer
David A. Patterson
William Lester Plishker
John Shalf
Samuel Webb Williams
Katherine A. Yelick
Technical report no. UCB/EECS-2006-183
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2006/EECS-2006-183.html
December 18, 2006
____________________________________
Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, 1966 [ ]
p.256 (pdf page 269)
The war brought nothing really new into the world; rather it sped up processes of change which had been going on for a considerable period and would have continued anyway, with the result that changes which would have taken place over a period of 30 or even 50 years in peacetime were brought about in 5 years during the war. Also, the the changes were much greater in objective facts and in the organization of society than they were in men's ideas of these facts or organization.
p.261 (pdf page 274)
More damaging than the reduction in the number of farm animals (which was made up in 6 or 7 years), or he drain on the fertility of the soil (which could be made up in 12 or 15 years), was the disruption of Europe's integration of agricultural production (which was never made up).
• The gestation and maturation delay in building up breeding populations of animals or plants, causing the characteristic oscillations of commodity prices: 4-year cycles for pigs, 7 years for cows, 11 years for cocoa trees.8
(Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: a history of the world in our time, first published in 1966, second printing 1974, p.33 (pdf page 48))
____________________________________
Evolution of the MOS transistor ── from conception to VLSI
written by Chih-tang Sah
B. DRAM technology advances from 4 kbits to 64 kbits (1972 to 1979)
The success in the volume production of the silicon MOS integrated circuit appears to have been controlled and driven by the introduction of new technology and new production equipment [144] until about 1982 when the manufacturing technology and production planning became manture from past experiences. Since 1983, market demand and recovery of research, development, and especially production equipment and clean room costs appear to have delayed the introduction of high (finer line) technology into MOS integrated circuit manufacturing [145]─[149]. Recent delays have been caused by the production shakedown of the submicron lithography tools.
Recovery of equipment and development costs of 256-kbit and 1-4-Mbit DRAMs has become a major factor that has dictated the three-year product introduction and delivery cycle in order to make business sense. For example, during a typical recent 3-year cycle, less than 1 million chips would be shipped for sampling during the introduction year, 5 million chips for mainframes in the second production year, and over 500 million chips for personal computers and comsumer products in the third and peak production year. This trend is best illustrated using the one-transistor DRAM cell for two reasons. First, it is the largest volume product. Second, the repetitive memory structure makes it a good test vehicle to advance the silicon integrated circuit process technology since it requires the least engineering man-year to design a full memory array on a chip (with several hundred thousands to 16 million transistors on the chip today) in order to run a full-scale test of a new technology in the factory environment. However, in the last few years high density MOS logic arrays have been increasingly used as the test vehicle by some American manufacturers [150].
This huge cost further reinforces the Gordon Moore criteria: recovery of equipment and development costs is the prime consideration for the manufacturing and volume delivery of future generation of submicron VLSI and ULSI chips.
(pdf 31)
; however, the first volume product at 2500 A or shorter channel length probably will not reach the marketplace until 1995 or later due to the many necessary technology developments even if it is not further delayed by future 5-year cycles of market and economic conditions.
H. A recapulation of the Bergulund-Moore-Intel scenarios
During 1981 to 1982 when Neil Berglund gave his talks under Intel's college seminar program [144], he showed that MOS VLSI advances had been driven by the availability of manufacturing equipment and technology.
Two years later in 1983, excess production capacity from both domestic and Asian producers had turned it into a market driven business, as pointed out by Gordon Moore [145].
Profitability or the recovery of equipment investment has continued to determine the volume production and delivery dates [176],
Volume delivery of DRAM has followed a three year cycle.
, but volume delivery for personal computer use had not begun in high gear at the end of 1987 although manufacturing capacities were already in place. The delay was designed to allow the recovery of the manufacturing capital equipment costs of the previous generation (256 kbits). The delay further helps the recovery of the equipment costs to produce the current generation (1-Mbit chip) by premium initial pricing to give high profit margin before substantial price drop when volume delivery begins.
─“”
source:
Evolution of the MOS transistor ── from conception to VLSI
written by Chih-tang Sah,
____________________________________
p.40
Air Force innovation
estimates of the outcome of development projects
Cost increases on the order of 20 to 30 percent and extension of development time by 1/3 to 1/2 are not the exception, but the rule
due to technological uncertainty and advances.128
source:
John Schutte, ‘Andrew W. Marshall and the Epistemic Community of the Cold War’, 2015, http://www.au.af.mil/au/aupress/digital/pdf/paper/dp_0016_schutte_casting_net_assessment.pdf
dp_0016_schutte_casting_net_assessment.pdf
Schutte, John M., 1976
Casting net assessment : Andrew W. Marshall and the epistemic community of the cold war / John M. Schutte, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.
1. Marshall, Andrew W., 1921─ 2. United States. department of defense. director of net assessment ── biography. 3. united states. department of defense ── officials and employees ── biography. 4. rand corporation ── biography. 5. united states ── forecasting. 6. military planning ── united states ── history ── 20th century. 7. military planning ── united states ── history ── 21st century. 8. united states ── military policy. 9. strategy. 10. cold war.
title: Andrew W. Marshall and the epistemic community of the cold war.
UA23.6.S43 2014
355.0092 -- dc23
____________________________________
── Michael V. Hayden: when we went to them for things nobody had done yet, we found that at best they weren't much better or faster than we were.
── And that was true even with a team that included such defense giants as SAIC, Boeing, CSC, AT&T, and Booz Allen Hamilton. We were also trying to do too much, too quickly.
── We would have been better advised to pick our spots and work incrementally, trusting to spiral development to eventually get us to where we wanted to be.
── (Michael V. Hayden, Playing to the edge : American intelligence in the age of terror, 2016, pp.20-21)
Michael V. Hayden, Playing to the edge : American intelligence in the age of terror, 2016
p.20
We found that when we went to industry for things they already knew how to do, we got impressive results. When we went to them for things nobody had done yet, we found that at best they weren't much better or faster than we were. And that was true even with a team that included such defense giants as SAIC, Boeing, CSC, AT&T, and Booz Allen Hamilton.
We were also trying to do too much, too quickly. Trailblazer comprised multiple moon shots.
([ DARPA - learning curve ])
p.21
We would have been better advised to pick our spots and work incrementally, trusting to spiral development to eventually get us to where we wanted to be.
(Playing to the edge : American intelligence in the age of terror / Michael V. Hayden, New York : Penguin Press, 2016, (hardback) (ebook), intelligence service──united states. | national security──united states. | united states. central intelligence agency. | united states. national security agency. | biography & autobiography / political. | political science / political freedom & security / intelligence. | history / united states / 21st century., JK468.I6 H39 2016 (print), JK468.I6 (ebook), 327.1273──dc23, 2016, )
[[ manufacturing ]]
[[ prototype ]]
[[ how many prototype did you build before you are satisfy with product ]]
____________________________________
• Babbage's statement: “It has been estimated, roughly, that the first individual of a newly invented machine will cost about five times as much as the construction of the second.”
Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: technology and economics, 1982
p.107
The possible wisdom of waiting is reinforced by observations, abundantly available to all would-be entrepreneurs, concerning the sad financial fate of innumerable earlier entrepreneurs who ended up in the bankruptcy courts because of their premature entrepreneurial activities.5
p.107
5 Marx long ago called attention to “the far greater cost of operating an establishment based on a new invention as compared to later establishments arising ex suis ossibus. This is so very true that the trail-blazers generally go bankrupt, and only those who later buy the buildings, machinery, etc., at a cheaper price, make money out of it” (Karl Marx, Capital [Foreign languages publishing house, moscow, 1959], vol. III, p. 103).
He also called attention to the rapid improvements in the productivity of machinery in its early stages as well as the sharp reduction in the cost of its production.
“When machine is first introduced into an industry, new methods of reproducing it more cheaply follow blow by blow, and so do improvements, that not only affect individual parts and details on the machine, but its entire build” (Karl Marx, Capital [Modern library edition, new york, no date], vol. I, p. 442).
In a footnote on that page, Marx cites approvingly Babbage's statement: “It has been estimated, roughly, that the first individual of a newly invented machine will cost about five times as much as the construction of the second.”
For discussion of related problems with respect to the growth of nations, see Ed Ames and Nathan Rosenberg, “Changing technological leadership and economic growth”, Economic journal, march 1963.
(Inside the black box./ Nathan Rosenberg, 1. technological innovations., 2. technology─social aspects., HC79.T4R673 1982, 338'.06, first published 1982, )
____________________________________
• experience curve and cost behaviours
George Stalk, Jr. (and) Thomas M. Hout., Competing against time, 2009 [ ]
p.5
experience curve strategies
'experience curve and cost behaviours strategy'
1960s
An example of an early insight is experience-curve cost behaviour. The theory of the experience curve is that the costs of complex products and services, when corrected for the effects of inflation and arbitrary accounting standards, typically decline about 20 to 30 percent with each doubling of accumulated experience.
The fact that cost decline with accumulated volume has been recognized for a long time. In 1925, officers in the U.S. Army observed that as accumulated production volume of airframes increased, per-unit costs declined. In later investigations, the Army more specifically described the nature of this dynamic: They calculated that the 4th plane assembled required only 80 percent as much direct labour as the 2nd, the 8th plane only 80 percent as much direct labour as the 4th, the 16th plane required only 80 percent as much direct labour as the 13th, and so on.
During World War II, the understanding of this cost behaviour was critical for planning resource requirements in the aircraft industry. After the war, the aircraft industry continued to plot learning curves. For example, the learning phenomena for the Martin-Marietta-built Boeing B-29 and the Lockheed-built Boeing B-17, as decribed in a 1957 article, are shown in Exhibit 1-1. Learning curves continue to be used to predict program costs, to set schedules, to evaluate management performance, and to justify contract pricings. Moreover, the concept has been disseminated beyond the aircraft industry.
(Stalk, George, HD69.T54S73 1990, 658.5'6——dc20, copyright © 2009)
( Competing against time : how time-based competition is reshaping gloabl markets / George Stalk, Jr. (and) Thomas M. Hout., 1. time management., 2. delivery of goods., 3. competition, international., 4. comparative advantage (international trade)., p.5)
George Stalk, Jr. (and) Thomas M. Hout., Competing against time, 2009 [ ]
pp.6-8
experience cost behaviours
'experience curve and cost behaviours strategy'
Being able to predict next year's prices is enormously important to management. Being able to predict prices in five and ten years hence is a major strategic advantage. The managements of certain aggressive companies have realized that well-documented cost behaviour could be factored into their pricing strategies. They set pricing and investment strategies as a function of volume-driven costs. At time, they reduced prices below current costs in anticipation of the decline in costs that they knew would result from expansion of volume. Capacity was added ahead of demand. The earliest companies to adopt experience-based strategies ran roughshod over their slower-adapting competitors. They often pre-empted their competitors by claiming enough of a growing demand so that when their competitors attempted a response, little volume remained, and the leaders' cost could not be matched.
(Stalk, George, HD69.T54S73 1990, 658.5'6——dc20, copyright © 2009)
( Competing against time : how time-based competition is reshaping gloabl markets / George Stalk, Jr. (and) Thomas M. Hout., 1. time management., 2. delivery of goods., 3. competition, international., 4. comparative advantage (international trade)., pp.6-8)
____________________________________
• “plateaus in the curve of learning.”
• learning curve
How to develop self-confidence & influence people by public speaking
by Dale Carnegie
pp.80─81
The necessity of persistence
When we start to learn any new thing, like French, or golf, or public speaking, we never advance steadiy. We do not improve gradually. We do it by sudden jerks, by abrupt starts. Then we remain stationary at time, or we may even slip back and lose some of the ground we have previously gained. These periods of stagnation, or retrogression, are known by all psychologists; and they have been named “plateaus in the curve of learning.” Students of public speaking will sometimes be stalled for weeks on one of these plateaus. Work as hard as they may, they cannot get off it. The weak ones give up in despair. Those with grit persist, and they find that suddenly, overnight, without their knowing how or why it has happened, they have made great progress. They have lifted from the plateau like an aeroplane. Abruptly they have gotten the knack of thing. Abruptly they have acquired naturalness and force and confidence in their speaking.
You may always, as we have noted else where in these pages, experience some fleeting fear, some shock, some nervous anxiety the first few moments you face an audience. But if you will but persevere, you will soon eradicate everything but this initial fear; and that will be initial fear, and nothing more. After the first few sentences, you will have control of yourself. You will be speaking with positive pleasure.
How to develop self-confidence & influence people by public speaking
by Dale Carnegie
____________________________________
• “Even under the most favorable conditions for advancing the scale frontier the cost side of the equation imposes fairly strict upper limits on the economical pace of advance, and trying to force the pace could mean sharply rising cost of development. The experience required for pushing out the scale frontier is related to time and cannot be acquired by increasing the number of similar new units. Perhaps the greatest uncertainties connected with units arise from problems that may not show up until the units have been in operation a few years. For the industry as a whole, the socially optimal number of pioneering units during the first two or three years of any major advance in scale, design, or steam conditions is probably rather small, most often ranging from perhaps two or three or half a dozen [a dozen is 12, half a dozen is 6]” (William Hughes, “Scale frontiers in electric power”, in William Capron [ed.], Technological change in regulated industries [The brooking institution, washington, d.c., 1971], p.52).
Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box: technology and economics, 1982
p.14
the distinction between inventive activity that is directed toward product improvement or entails the invention of a new product, and inventive activity that is cost-reducing ── or process invention.
p.108
In their earliest stages, innovations are often highly imperfect and are known to be so. Innumerable “bugs” may need to be worked out.8
8 This term should be taken to include a great many production problems involving the use of new equipment that become apparent only as a result of extensive use ─ for example, metal fatigue in aeroplanes. William Hughes has made this point well with respect to exploration of the scale frontier in electric power generation: “Even under the most favorable conditions for advancing the scale frontier the cost side of the equation imposes fairly strict upper limits on the economical pace of advance, and trying to force the pace could mean sharply rising cost of development. The experience required for pushing out the scale frontier is related to time and cannot be acquired by increasing the number of similar new units. Perhaps the greatest uncertainties connected with units arise from problems that may not show up until the units have been in operation a few years. For the industry as a whole, the socially optimal number of pioneering units during the first two or three years of any major advance in scale, design, or steam conditions is probably rather small, most often ranging from perhaps two or three or half a dozen [6]” (William Hughes, “Scale frontiers in electric power”, in William Capron [ed.], Technological change in regulated industries [The brooking institution, washington, d.c., 1971], p.52). One of the other virtues of the Hughes article is its forceful reminder of the intimate link that often exists between technological progress and economies of scale. “The realization of latent scale economies is an especially important form of technological progress in the utility industries” (ibid.,p.45).
(Inside the black box./ Nathan Rosenberg, 1. technological innovations., 2. technology─social aspects., HC79.T4R673 1982, 338'.06, first published 1982, )
____________________________________
..., and then multiply by three (x3, *3)
◇p.103
Jay Forrester used to tell us, when we were modeling a construction or processing delay, to ask everyone in the system how long they thought the delay was, make our best guess, and then multiply by three. (That correction factor also works perfectly, I have found, for estimating how long it will take to write a book!)
(Thinking in systems : a primer, Donella H. Meadows, Edited by Diana Wright, sustainability institute, 2008, QA 402 .M425 2008, ◇p.103 )
([ for construction or processing delay ])
source:
published public information on cost projection of program
But even the costs of that comparatively modest goal ballooned to the point where the program is estimated to run about $17.6 billion, nearly three times the original projections.
---------------------------
Comparatively modest
goal ballooned
---------------------------
The program is estimated
to run about $17.6
billion, nearly three
times the original
projections.
===========================
([ program cost estimation ])
satellite
Sbirs GEO-1 Launches At Last
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIrS)
geosynchronous
Col. Roger Teague, commander of the Infrared Space Systems Directorate at Air Force Space and Missile Defense in Los Angeles.
“The SBIRS system will remain the golden standard for missile warning. It will be the backbone of the important mission we do to provide that early warning for hostile missiles and threats for our nation and allies,” Teague said.
With it, "we can see much more, much earlier, much sooner,” he said.
the first of four SBIRS geostationary satellites -- which orbit the planet in a fixed spot relative to Earth -- will add to the two highly elliptical satellites already in place.
SBIRS GEO-1 will provide persistent surveillance of just one hotspot, warzone or hostile nation -- which one exactly is classified
After its launch, the satellite will take nine days to achieve its orbit. It could take another six months before it starts providing intelligence data, however. The satellite will then undergo a certification process that will take roughly 17 months, whereupon it should receive approval to participate in integrated warning assessments and operations, providing 24/7 persistent surveillance with its unblinking, sleepless infrared sensors.
The fourth and final SBIRS satellite is scheduled for launch in 2016, Teague said.
Teague acknowledged that the launch of SBIRS GEO-1 is the beginning of the end of a long road fraught with technical and cost challenges for the U.S. Air Force and its contractors, which include Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Aerospace Corp.
Defense officials conceived of SBIRS in 1995 as a means to update the Defense Support Program satellites, first launched in 1970. While the Strategic Defense Initiative envisioned refashioning such satellites with space-based defense weapons to blast incoming missiles from the sky, SBIRS took a more conservative approach of fitting more advanced sensors to the new satellites.
But even the costs of that comparatively modest goal ballooned to the point where the program is estimated to run about $17.6 billion, nearly three times the original projections.
Despite the massive cost overruns, the basic specifications for the two infrared sensor packages onboard GEO-1 remained stable, said Jeff Smith, SBIRS program manager at Lockheed Martin, which built the satellite.
A scanning sensor will conduct sweeps for information on missile launches, while a staring sensor will analyze a fixed location, Smith explained.
The scanning sensor likely would pick up threat information first due to its wider range but the staring sensor could provide more detailed information on a threat
http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/05/05/air-force-launch-star-wars-style-missile-defense/
reuters 2011/05/07 usa-military-satellite
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/business/launches+billion+missile+defence+satellite/4746975/story.html
http://www.itwire.com/science-news/space/46993-us-missile-defense-geo-1-launched-into-space
By William Atkins
Monday, 09 May 2011 00:22
____________________________________
war cost estimation
worst-case estimate ─ 4x available cost estimation [4xace]
Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008
pp.265-266 a piece of truth
War with Iraq would cost 1 to 2 percent of the gross domestic product.
[ the administration lowball the war cost to help for an easier sell ]
Lawrence Lindsay
4 to 8 percent of GDP
As Bush and Cheney prepared to leave office, the war's financial toll quadrupled [Lawrence] Lidsay's worst-case estimate.
p.138 Jack Goldsmith
he [Cheney] has never hidden the ball.
The amazing thing is that he does what he says.
It was impressive, even if it was bizarro.
It was a will to power.”
(Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008, )
____________________________________
• Eric Schaeffer, chief of EPA's office of regulatory enforcement
“It's a lot of money. In the long run, finally, finally, most of these power plants will have scrubbers, but they've dragged it out for thirty years.”
Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008
pp.208-209
Eric Schaeffer, chief of EPA's office of regulatory enforcement
“It's a lot of money. In the long run, finally, finally, most of these power plants will have scrubbers, but they've dragged it out for thirty years.”
In his resignation letter, Schaeffer said the nine companies he sued “emit an incredible 5 million tons of sulfer dioxide every year (a quarter of the emission in the entire country) as well as 2 million tons of nitrogen oxide.” The agency's uncontested scientific data showed that 10,800 died prematurely each year because of that pollution. The White House, he said, had snatched “defeat from the jaws of victory” because most of the plant owners had been ready to settle. Two of them withdrew from consent decrees.
As the second Bush-Cheney term neared an end, final rules had yet to be written or enforced.
“Every day you can postpone saves them a lot of money”, Schaeffer said in an interview, speaking of plant owners. “It's a lot of money. In the long run, finally, finally, most of these power plants will have scrubbers, but they've dragged it out for thirty years.”
(Angler: the Cheney vice presidency, Barton Gellman, 2008, pp.208-209, )
____________________________________
Sugar film
Kelly Brownell, Ph.D.
The companies selling sugar beverages have for the most part, themselves or through their trade association fought strongly against every public health measure to try and address the obesity problem that would affect sales of their product.
Beware of this pattern
denying, delaying, begrudgingly acknowledge the problem; hey, we'll solve it for you.
This pattern
Denying
They'll spend a lot of time denying that they're causing the problem
Delaying
Then they'll spend a lot of time delaying government regulation, or any sort of action, on anybody part, to hold them account able.
Third phase
Begrudgingly acknowledging, you know having some association with the problem; hey guys, but we're going to solve it for you. We are going to make our food more healthy. Health washing. Processed food, green washing. And that's where it gets tricky for consumers.
Having a car and running it on the wrong fuel.
[[ a car buff or an automobile fanatic would never think of putting the wrong fuel in their car; however, because our body does not come with a user and operating manual, we have been fooled repeatedly into putting the wrong fuel into our body. Then, we end up paying the cost at the back end for poor health, lower quality of life, spending less time with your grand children, and rising health care debt burden. ]]
source:
Sugar film
____________________________________
Theodore Rockwell., The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / 1992,
p.339
“When you've done 90 percent of the work on a project, you'd better have 50 percent of the money left in the budget.”
(The rickover efffect : how one man made a difference / Theodore Rockwell., 1. rickover, hyman george., 2. nuclear submarines ── united states ── history.
3. admirals ── united states ── biography., 4. united states., navy──biography, V63.R54R63 1992, 359.3'2574'092--dc20, united states naval institute, Annapolis, Maryland, 1992 )
____________________________________
Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos., Skunk works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed, 1994
p.325
that final 10 per cent striving ... costs 40 per cent of the total expenditure on most projects.
p.283
it's more important to listen than to talk.
decisive: even a timely wrong decision is better than no decision.
don't half-heartedly wound problems ── kill them dead.
(Skunk works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed / Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos., 1. lockheed advanced development company ─ history., 2. rich, ben r. ─ career in aeronautics., 3. aeronautics ─ research ─ united states ─ history., TL.565.R53 1994, 338.7'623746'0973, 338.7623 rich, 1994, )
____________________________________
Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos., Skunk works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed, 1994
• “Avionics is the killer expense, costing about $7000 a pound in a new airplane.”, Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos., Skunk works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed, 1994, p.322 [field / discipline: aircraft development]
p.321
development costs of fighters
unit procurement costs have risen 11 per cent every year since 1963!
p.322
we didn't start from scratch but adapted off-the-shelf avionics developed by others
Avionics is the killer expense, costing about $7000 a pound in a new airplane.
p.325
that final 10 per cent striving ... costs 40 per cent of the total expenditure on most projects.
([ the first 90 per cent of the work ... costs 60 per cent of the total expenditure ])
(Skunk works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed / Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos., 1. lockheed advanced development company ─ history., 2. rich, ben r. ─ career in aeronautics., 3. aeronautics ─ research ─ united states ─ history.,
TL.565.R53 1994, 338.7'623746'0973, 338.7623 rich, 1994, )
____________________________________
p.10
First, it is clear from Figure 1 that the immediate source of the modernization crisis is the eleven year gap in procurement between 1992 and 2002, during which almost no new aircraft enter the inventory. Consequently, the distribution of the ages of the individual aircraft making up the inventory will become progressively distorted over time, and a disproportionately large number of fighters will reach retirement age at the same time.
Two criteria are needed to answer this question--an age goal and a size goal. First, I will argue that the Air Force should set a goal of 10 years to be reached by 2002 for the average age of its inventory of fighter aircraft. While an average age of ten years would be very old by historical standards (see Figure 3), it is the same rule of thumb adopted by planners in the Air Force between the late 1970s and early 1990s. This rule of thumb was not pulled out of thin air. It was adopted by the Air Force after a long agonizing debate. Under this assumption, fighters would be retired at about twenty-two years of age, once the need to replace crashed aircraft is accounted for.
to begin two lower-cost, fast-paced, fly-before-you-buy, competitive prototype programs. Before describing these programs, let me explain why a fly-before-you-buy strategy is so important.
Competitive prototyping is a sequential, decision-making strategy for reducing technical and economic risks while preserving the decision maker's freedom of action. Its goal is to work the bugs out of a design before committing substantial resources to its factors of production (manufacturing engineering, specialized machine tools, unique factory facilities, a network of supplier relationships, and the hiring of production workers). Although prototypes are handmade by design engineers and skilled technicians using general purpose machine tools, production engineers should be deeply involved in a prototype's design to insure the ultimate product can be produced at a reasonable cost.
Moreover, as more detailed information flows out of the design and testing activities, they should prepare for an orderly transition to efficient production by continuously refining their plans for factory layouts, machine tools, worker skills, subcontractors, etc.
But under a competitive prototyping strategy, the decision to commit resources to production would be deferred until rigorous testing demonstrated which product best met the specifications.
Prototyping also reduces risk by reducing up-front costs. This gives decision makers the flexibility to simultaneously explore multiple design options, even during periods of declining budgets. (During the post-Viet Nam contraction in the early 1970s, for example, the Air Force successfully designed and flight tested six new designs in three competitive prototype programs--the YF-16/17, YA-9/10, and YC-14/15 aircraft).
In reality, the cost of fixing major design flaws on airplanes moving down an assembly line can escalate rapidly to prohibitive levels, particularly if assembly line tooling or factory layouts must be changed.
Nevertheless, cancellation is usually impossible, because the early commitment to low rate production permits the contractor to build a powerful political base by hiring a large number of production workers and establishing a nation-wide network of subcontractors.
A second deterrent to cancellation stems from the high up-front cost of the EMD strategy--it forces decision makers to put all their eggs in one basket, and in contrast to a competitive prototyping strategy, they can not afford to explore other options. So, when a new weapon fails to meet its performance specifications or cost goals, the economic and political pressures of the real world force decision makers to reduce specifications, accept large cost increases as being inevitable, stretch out production schedules, and cut back total production quantities.
The routine practice of waiving specifications and goals is known among defense contractors as managing to a rubber baseline.
Competitive prototyping reduces the risk of being boxed in by rubber baselines. Risk reduction is particularly important when budgets are tight. To maximize risk reduction, each prototype should be as close to being a fully combat-capable replica of the eventual production item as possible.
Each airplane would be designed to operate as part of a truly integrated, air-ground, combined-arms team in expeditionary warfare against the likely threats in the post-cold war era. Each must be easy to deploy from the continental United States to overseas operating locations and would be able to operate for extended periods of time from relatively primitive forward locations.
While a vigorous prototype competition would increase the business risk to the contractors, the simulation of capitalistic market forces would also stimulate their creativity, efficiency, and enthusiasm, as it clearly did during the Lightweight Fighter competition in the early 1970s.
This explanation is particularly needed to counter the revelations that the CIA knowingly served as a conduit for KGB disinformation that may have inflated Soviet strengths in order to dupe U.S. decision makers into spending money on unneeded, high-cost weapons.
Fifth, the overwhelming majority of deep targets are fixed targets at known locations. If one accepts the promises of our technologists, these targets are particularly appropriate for unmanned, long-range, stand-off, precision-guided weapons, like cruise missiles.
Out-of-control political selection pressures, like those evident in the porkfest on Capital Hill last summer, evolving within a real world of cost overruns and budget cutbacks, could easily wreck our military forces in order to prop up the contractors who created the problem, with the active assistance of the bureaucrats in the Pentagon and the threat inflators at the CIA.
source:
Defense time bomb :
background : F-22/JSF case study :
hypothestical escape option
by Franklin C. Spinney
March 6, 1996
The views expressed in this paper do not represent the official position of the Department of defense
16 page count
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Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect : the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, [1995]
p.23
As part of the process, we shifted from a 1-year to a 5-year planning period, a revolutionary change that has now spread across the government. And we instituted the Planning, Programming, Budgeting system [PPBS] to clarify procurement choices.
( In retrospect : the tragedy and lesson of Vietnam / Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark.──1st ed., 1. vietnam conflict, 1961─1975 ── united states., DS558.M44 1995, 959.704'3373──dc20, )
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Alan Kay, 2015: Power of Simplicity
https://youtu.be/NdSD07U5uBs?t=1992
https://youtu.be/NdSD07U5uBs?t=1992
Aug 10, 2015
ten years ago today
ten years into the future
go back ten years from today
let's imagine a 10-year vision (10-year plan) (10-year blueprint)
five-year horizon are necessary
five-year horizon, most invention come up in the first three years
you set a three year horizon, you're not going to get them
that five year horizon allows the people to do the right thing the first year
at Apple, most of the thing we did took about three years
if everything go right, you get a ~ 7 years thing from this 10 year framework that you have set up
7 years ago, Today was 7 years in the Future!
anything that's new, 7 years is about ... you can do it,
you can almost do always do it under 10
a [relatively] small amount of money, but allocated over a time that could be
a [relatively] small amount of money, but allocated over a time that could be
longer than most CEO stay around ...
very dollar that you take out of this thing, is a dollar that you can used to improve the bottom line
ARPA funded universities
IBM couldn't do it
the goose that laid the golden eggs
it's not their business; their business is to count those golden eggs after they get laid
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Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect : the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, [1995]
p.xvii
The ancient Greek dramatist Aeschylus wrote, “The reward of suffering is experience.”
p.29
We must be clear-sighted in beginnings, for, as in their budding we discern not the danger, so in their full growth we perceive not the remedy
── Montaigne, Essays
Michael Eyquem de Montaigne
( In retrospect : the tragedy and lesson of Vietnam / Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark.──1st ed., 1. vietnam conflict, 1961─1975 ── united states., DS558.M44 1995, 959.704'3373──dc20, )
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The necessary revolution : how individual and organizations are working together to create a sustainable world,
Peter Senge,
Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur, Sara Schley,
2008
p.172 The System-thinking Iceberg
p.173
four factors that influence any situations:
events,
patterns or trends,
deeper systemic structures or forces,
and the mental models or assumptions that shape these structures and force.
pp.174-177
p.173 events
The first level of the iceberg can be summed up in the question "What just happened?"
p.173
Immediate events are tangible, they catch our attention—much like a loud noise that suddenly causes us to drop everything and look up.
p.173
The problem is that events can so dominate our attention that we get stuck here and, as a result, miss the bigger picture entirely.
p.174
(???) When people are stuck at this level, they see only the tip of the iceberg and can do little except react as new circumstances arise. ([ this is also called, firefighting mode — essentially all you can do is to put out the fire, move from one problem to the next, from crisis to crisis. ])
p.174 patterns/trends
"What is happening over time?" Answering this question takes us a little deeper into the system, a little below the typical water surface.
p.174
But most players react to falling profits by fishing harder to maintain their revenues. If they do so, however, the fishery will collapse. (???)
p.175 systemic structures or forces
Ask, "What are the deeper forces driving these patterns or trends and how do they arise?"
p.175
In other words, when the fish companies are experiencing their greatest revenue, the fishery is most stressed. On the surface, profits are high, but below the surface (literally and metaphorically in the systems thinking iceberg) the fish population is collapsing.
p.175
So in order to avert disaster, companies must cut back their fishing at the very moment when the pressures to keep growing are greatest! (???)
p.176 mental models.
We all hold mental models —— some shared across a society, others across a social class, a political party, an industry, a particular company, or even within our own family. What is often less clear is how these models affect, even dictate, our thoughts and actions and the thinking of those around us.
In other words, when the fish companies are experiencing their greatest revenue, the fishery is most stressed. On the surface, profits are high, but below the surface (literally and metaphorically in the systems thinking iceberg) the fish population is collapsing.
p.174
Ways of explaining reality
**increasing leverage and opportunity for learning
||
|| Events React
|| what just happened?
||
|| Patterns/Trends Anticipate/expectation
|| what's been happening over time?
|| have we been here or some
|| place similar before?
||
|| Systemic Structures Design/co-design/co-evolution
|| what are the deeper forces driving these
|| patterns or trends and how do they arise?
|| what are the forces at play
|| contributing to these pathways?
||
|| Mental Models Transform/re-form/re-organise/re-call
|| what about our thinking
|| allows this situation to persist?
\/
figure 12.1
p.177
Why is it so important to look beneath the surface at the deeper levels of reality? Because in our experience it is often the key to lasting change. When people or organizations pay attention only to the visible tip of the iceberg, they can only react to change as it happens — so at best, they survive the crisis. They often try to compensate for their lack of analysis of a problem with aggressive and "proactive" strategies. But being "proactive" from a reactive mind-set is reactive just the same. With long enough lever, boasted Archimedes, "I can move the world."
(The necessary revolution : how individual and organizations are working together to create a sustainable world, Peter Senge, Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur, Sara Schley, 2008, 338.927 Senge, pp.172-177)
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"It takes about six learning cycle, roughly, to complete one generation."
Oral history of Shang-Yi chiang
interviewed by: Douglas Fairbairn
recorded on March 15, 2022
computer history museum (CHM)
"When we develop one node, basically you have some learning cycles. First, you do some simulation. And you have some idea, then you run wafers to prove that. So, you run a group of wafers according to simulation and you have some splits. The wafer runs through the fab, they come out and you measure them, you analyze them, and you try to improve and you run this again. This again, you run. So, this is learning cycle."
"It takes about six learning cycle, roughly, to complete one generation."
"My R&D wafer in the fab run much faster than yours, because my R&D engineer works three shifts and you only work one shift. So, your R&D wafer move eight hours a day, my work/move 24-hours a day. So, my wafers go three times faster, even if you are twice smarter than me, I still beat you up."
https://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/2022/07/102792671-05-01-acc.pdf
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https://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/2022/07/102792671-05-01-acc.pdf
Chiang: Intel, Motorola, National, HP. And they're all my customers.
Fairbairn: Right
Chiang: And the board member they sent to Sematech for many companies happen to be the person also in charge of the supply chain. Well, they are my major customer, but on the Sematech board we kind of sit together, we can discuss things on equal base. Not like my customer. <laughs> And so, in that platform we are able to-- some time we are able to more freely exchange some information. So, one time at a dinner, they asked me, they said that, "We all take two years to develop one generation, how come you guys can do it in one or one-and-a-half year?" And they asked if some of your customer transfer technology to you or what not? And I told him, "No," I told him that, "That's not true." I think he probably implied we steal technology from customer, the way he talk.
And I say, "I'll tell you why." I said that, "When we develop one node, basically you have some learning cycles. First, you do some simulation. And you have some idea, then you run wafers to prove that. So, you run a group of wafers according to simulation and you have some splits. The wafer runs through the fab, they come out and you measure them, you analyze them, and you try to improve and you run this again. This again, you run. So, this is learning cycle." At that time, "It takes about six learning cycle , roughly, to complete one generation." Of course, you had some short loops and not just one. I said that, "My R&D wafer in the fab run much faster than yours, because my R&D engineer works three shifts and you only work one shift. So, your R&D wafer move eight hours a day, my work/move 24-hours a day. So,
my wafers go three times faster, even if you are twice smarter than me, I still beat you up." <laughter>
Fairbairn: That's what everybody says. Faster learning cycle, right?
Chiang: Faster learning cycle. And three to one is kind of a little bit exaggerated, because it's usually night shift it's not very effective. Just the idea. But because I knew at HP, TSMC R&D wafer did move much, much faster than HP. But HP is not a good benchmark
Fairbairn: Not a good bench-- yeah.
Chiang: And then they ask me, "How can you make your R&D engineer work night shift?" And I kind of joke with them -- and I can share with you the real reason what I think. But at that time, I told them, I said, "In Taiwan, we all have to serve the military." I said, "I did. When you're in service, you-- especially in the basic training-- you take a duty for the security guard."
Fairbairn: Mm hm, stand watch.
Chiang: Stand watch, right. "It may be my turn from 2 a.m. to 3 a.m. Then the guy would wake me up at 1:45. Then I got up, I change my clothes, I got my helmet, got my rifle, then I went over at 2 o'clock, and 2:45 I wake up another guy. And so, all my engineers have been through that. So, I tell him to, you know,
it's your turn to do that! <laughs> Don’t complain!" <laughter>
And what interesting at that time, the board member from Motorola, I just remember, his name was Bill Walker-- I don't know if you know him or not?
Fairbairn: No, I don't think I know him.
Chiang: Bill Walker. He's a big, big guy. Later on, I found he used to be a Marine. I knew that later.
Fairbairn: Yeah.
Chiang: Because he was one of my very large customers, I usually visit him once a year.
Fairbairn: Mm hm.
Chiang: I went over with our sales manager and the two of us usually went to his office. And he had one of his Supply Chain Manager - four of us sit-down. Usually Bill would give us a lecture telling us what we did wrong and how bad we behaved. I took notes. The meeting lasts an hour. Next time I visit him, they took me to a different room. I found it a little bit different. When they opened the door, there were about 20 people around the table. He was in charge of R&D and the manufacturing for Motorola Semiconductor Worldwide. He said, "These are my R&D and the fab managers in the entire world. I got them together. I want you to tell the same story to them." <laughter> So, that was what I always told them but they didn’t listen.
Fairbairn: So, what was the real answer about <laughter>?
Chiang: The real answer is I, honestly, I just share with you, I think the culture. Asians are more hungry, because we had a tougher life. So, to make money is more important to us. People are willing to sacrifice their own privacy, their private life in order to have financial security.
Fairbairn: That's what you did. You moved to Taiwan without your wife or your family, right?
Chiang: Right. Just to make a living.
Fairbairn: And work 22 hours a day.
Chiang: <laughs> But not later. So, I firmly believe this is one of the really important reasons why TSMC succeeded. It's culture. If equipment went down, because equipment depreciation cost was so high, you really want to run your equipment 24 hours a day. In United States, if equipment went down, wait until next morning. The people come in at eight o'clock and probably go to fix it, nine o'clock. Yeah. But if at two o'clock in the morning, we just called the equipment engineer, "You come right away," he won't complain. And his wife won't complain. And that's the way it is.
Fairbairn: Right.
Chiang: And that help a lot.
https://archive.computerhistory.org/resources/access/text/2022/07/102792671-05-01-acc.pdf
____________________________________
•─ It usually takes five or six attempts to get a product right.
Donald A. Norman, The psychology of everyday things, 1988 [ ]
In Don Norman's wonderful book "The Psychology of Everyday Things" (now called "The Design of Everyday Things" in paperback)
p.29
It usually takes five or six attempts to get a product right. This may be acceptable in an established product, but consider what it means in a new one. Suppose a company wants to make a product that will perhaps make a real difference. The problem is that if the product is truly revolutionary, it is unlikely that anyone will quite know how to design it right the first time; it will take several tries. But if a product is introduced into the marketplace and fails, well that is it. Perhaps it could be introduced a second time, or maybe even a third time, but after that it is dead: everyone believes it to be a failure.
I asked him to explain. “You mean,” I said, “that it takes 5 or 6 tries to get an idea right?”
“Yes,” he said, “at least that.”
“But,” I replied, “you also said that if a newly introduced product doesn't catch on in the first two or three times, then it is dead?”
“Yup,” he said.
“Then new products are almost guaranteed to fail, no matter how good the idea.”
“Now you understand,” said the designer. “Consider the use of voice messages on complex devices such as cameras, soft-drink machines, and copiers. A failure. No longer even tried. Too bad. It really is a good idea, for it can be very useful when the hands or eyes are busy elsewhere. But those first few attempts were very badly done and the public scoffed--properly. Now, nobody dares try it again, even in those places where it is needed.”
(Norman, Donald A., The psychology of everyday things, 1. design, industrial--psychological, aspects, 2. human engineering, copyright © 1988, 620.82 Norman, p.29)
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Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge : building and sustaining the sources of innovation, 1995
pp.263—264
Iteration in activities
The fourth characteristic is an appreciation for the iterative, return-loop nature of all activities. Whether the activity be problem solving, experimenting, importing knowledge from outside, or transferring knowledge, managers in the companies that successfully develop core capabilities know that they can never walk away from that activity with the assumption that it is now perfected. Managers in some companies seem to have the attitude about their job attributed to God by 18th-century Deists——that the world was set in motion and then abandoned to itself. Yet developing core capabilities is more like growing a garden than like building a brick wall. Activities and projects need watering with fresh insights, fertilizing with resources, the sunlight of management attention——along with an evening respite from constant management oversight. One cannot assume that a job done is a job finished.
(Leonard-Barton, Dorothy, copyright © 1995, HD30.2.L46 1995, 658.4'038——dc20)
(Wellsprings of Knowledge : building and sustaining the sources of innovation / Dorothy Leonard-Barton, 1. information technology——management, 2. information resources management, 3. management information systems, pp.263—264)
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·‘’•─“”
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