Bottom line up front (BLUF)
•─ whether civilizations have a life cycle and follow a similar pattern of change.
•─ these civilizations tend to pass through a common pattern of experience.
•─ In more than a dozen other civilizations the Age of expansion was followed by an Age of crisis, and this, in turn, by a period of Universal empire in which a single political unit ruled the whole extent of the civilization. Western civilization, on the contrary, did not pass from the Age of crisis to the Age of universal empire, but instead was able to reform itself and entered upon a new period of expansion. Moreover, Western civilization did this not once, but several times. It was this ability to reform or reorganize itself again and again which made Western civilization the dominant factor in the world at the beginning of the 20th century.
•─ Of these twelve dead or dying cultures, six have been destroyed by Europeans bearing the culture of Western Civilization.
Please read the first 30 pages of Tragedy and hope movement,
go to en.wikipedia.org page on Tragedy and hope, and look for the resource near the bottom the page that should get you to the pdf file for Tragedy and hope. or
bing or google Tragedy and hope, Carroll Quigley
and find Tragedy_and_Hope.pdf that way
most web browser has an embedded pdf file reader,
Simply use the web browser to open the pdf file, treating it like a web page.
If you are time constrainted, you can read one page per day for 30 days, so within one month, you would have the coverage.
Why?
Tragedy and hope is written by Carroll Quigley
when Bill Clinton (the former POTUS, president of the united states) was in college, he said, he took this class, given by Prof. Carroll Quigley, and this is the TEXT they used in the class.
I read a thing or a Bill Clinton interview and that's how I learned about Tragedy and Hope, written by Carroll Quigley. What ever it was, or what ever it is, former POTUS Clinton gave a high mark and great review of Prof. Carroll Quigley and the TEXT, Tragedy and Hope. I am sure you can bing (google, duckduckgo, dogpile, microsoft copilot), Bill Clinton took a class from prof. Carroll Quigley use text tragedy and hope interview, and see what you come up with.
If you do not know Bill Clinton, or you do not like Bill Clinton, or you like Bill Clinton, or you like Hillary; never mind, if you have not read this, then I want you to read it. 30 pages is not too much to ask. If you like the writing and the subject, you can read the rest at your own choosing; if you do read it [Tragedy and Hope] like I ask, then you lost time reading 30 pages of something you are not interested in. At least now, you know, this TEXT exist, and there is a guy, Carroll Quigley who wrote it.
This is the movement. Read 30 pages of Tragedy and Hope.
Tragedy and hope : a history of the world in our time, written by Carroll Quigley, first published in 1966.
p.3
, men have been puzzling over the problem whether civilizations have a life cycle and follow a similar pattern of change.
From this discussion has emerged a fairly general agreement that men live in separately organized societies, each with its own distinct culture, that some of these societies,
pp.3─4
; and that these civilizations tend to pass through a common pattern of experience.
From these studies it would seem that civilizations pass through a process of evolution which can be analyzed briefly as follows:
each civilization is born into some inexplicable fashion and,
after a slow start,
enters a period of vigorous expansion,
increasing its size and power,
both internally and at the expense of its neighbors,
until gradually a crisis of organization appears.
When this crisis has passed and the civilization has been reorganized, it seems somewhat different. Its vigor and morale have weakened. It becomes stabilized and eventually stagnant. After a Golden Age of peace and prosperity, internal crises again arise. At this point there appears, for the first time, a moral and physical weakness which raises, also for the first time, questions about the civilization's ability to defend itself against external enemies. Racked by internal struggles of a social and constitutional character, weakened by loss of faith in its older ideologies and by the challenge of newer ideas incompatible with its past nature, the civilization grows steadily weaker until it is submerged by outside enemies and eventually disappears.
p.4
In more than a dozen other civilizations the Age of expansion was followed by an Age of crisis, and this, in turn, by a period of Universal empire in which a single political unit ruled the whole extent of the civilization. Western civilization, on the contrary, did not pass from the Age of crisis to the Age of universal empire, but instead was able to reform itself and entered upon a new period of expansion. Moreover, Western civilization did this not once, but several times. It was this ability to reform or reorganize itself again and again which made Western civilization the dominant factor in the world at the beginning of the 20th century.
p.4
The age of expansion is generally marked by four kinds of expansion:
(1) of population,
(2) of geographic area,
(3) of production, and
(4) of knowledge.
p.4
an older core area (which had existed as part of the civilization even before the period of expansion) and
a newer peripheral area (which became part of the civilzation only in the period of expansion and later).
If we wish, we can make, ..., a third, semiperipheral area between the core area and the fully peripheral area.
Mesopotamian Civilization (6000 B.c-300 B.C.)
Cretan Civilization (3500 B.C.-I 100 B.C.)
Canaanite Civilization (2200 B.C.-IOO B.C.)
Western Civilization (A.D. 400 to some time in the future)
p.5
Another way of saying this is that the core passes from the Age of expansion to the Age of conflict before the periphery does.
Eventually, in most civilizations the rate of expansion begins to decline everywhere.
p.5
This latter [Age of conflict] is the most complex, most interesting, and most critical of all the periods of the life cycle of a civilization.
It is marked by four chief characteristics:
(a) it is a period of declining rate of expansion;
(b) it is a period of growing tensions and class conflicts;
(c) it is a period of increasingly frequent and increasingly violent imperialist cars; and
(d) it is a period of growing irrationality, pessimism, superstitions, and other worldliness. All these phenomena appear in the core area of a civilization before they appear in more peripheral portions of the society.
p.5
Social classes and political units within the civilzation try to compensate for the slowing of expansion through normal growth by the use of violence against other social classes or against other political units. From this come class struggles and imperialist wars. The outcomes of these struggles within the civilization are not of vital significance for the future of the civilization itself.
p.6
Indeed, the class struggles and imperialist wars of the Age of conflict will probably serve to increase the speed of the civilization's decline because they dissipate capital and divert wealth and energies from productive to nonproductive activities.
Thus, Mesopotamia's core was conquered by semi-peripheral Babylonia about 1700 B.C., while the whole of Mesopotamian civilization was conquered by more peripheral Assyria about 725 B.C. (replaced by fully peripheral Persia about 525 B.C.).
Mayan Civilization (1000 B . C - A.D. 1550)
Andean Civilization (1500 B.C.-A.D. 1600)
Canaanite Civilization (2200 B.C.-146 B.C.)
Sinic civilization
valley of the Yellow river
Chin and Han empires
Ural-Altaic invaders
(a) Chinese Civilization, which began about A.D. 400, culminated in the Manchu Empire after 1644, and was disrupted by European invaders in the period 1700-1930, and
(b) Japanese Civilization, which began about the time of Christ, culminated in the Tokugawa Empire after 1600, and may have been completely disrupted
by invaders from Western Civilization in the century following 1853.
Indie Civilization, which began about 3500 B.C., was destroyed by Aryan invaders about 1700 B.C Hindu Civilization, which emerged from Indie Civilization about 1700 B.C., culminated in the Mogul Empire and was destroyed by invaders from Western Civilization in the period 1500-1900.
Islamic Civilization, which began about A.D. 500, culminated in the Ottoman Empire in the period 1300-1600 and has been in the process of being destroyed by invaders from Western Civilization since about 1750.
Of these twelve dead or dying cultures, six have been destroyed by Europeans bearing the culture of Western Civilization. When we consider the untold numbers of other societies, simpler than civilizations, which Western Civilization has destroyed or is now destroying, societies such as the Hottentots, the Iroquois, the Tasmanians, the Navahos, the Caribs, and countless others, the full frightening power of Western Civilization becomes obvious.
p.7
see bottom half of page seven
Civilization Its dates Universal empire Final invasions their dates
p.8
By creating a new culture from the various elements offered from the barbarian tribes, the Roman world, the Saracen world, and above all the Jewish world (Christianity), Western Civilization became a new societv.
p.9
This new Age of Expansion, frequently called the period of commercial capitalism, lasted from about 1440 to about 1680.
p.9
The real impetus
to economic expansion during the period came from efforts to obtain
profits by the interchange of goods, especially semiluxury or luxury
goods, over long distances.
In time, this system of commercial capitalism became petrified into a structure of vested interests in which profits were sought by imposing restrictions on the production or interchange of goods rather than by encouraging these activities.
This new vested-interest structure, usually called mercantilism, became such a burden on economic activities that the rate of expansion of economic life declined and even gave rise to a period of economic decline in the decades immediately following 1690.
p.10
The social organization which was at the center of this new development might be called "industrial capitalism."
"monopoly capitalism."
Leaving aside this hypothetical future, it would appear
thus that Western Civilization, in approximately fifteen hundred years,
has passed through eight periods, thus:
1. Mixture, 350-700
2. Gestation, 700-970
3A. First Expansion, 970-1270
4A. First Conflict, 1270-1440
Core Empire: England, 1420
3B. Second Expansion, 1440-1690
4B. Second Conflict, 1690-1815
Core Empire: France, 1810
3C. Third Expansion, 1770-1929
4C. Third Conflict, 1893-
Core Empire: Germany, 1942
p.11
In such a situation Western Civilization played a role as invader similar to that played by the Germanic tribes in Classical Civilization,
by the Dorians in Cretan Civilization,
by the Greeks in Mesopotamian or Egyptian Civilization,
by the Romans in Canaanite Civilization, or
by the Ayrans in Indie Civilization.
The Westerners who burst in upon
the Aztecs in 1519, on
the Incas in 1534 on
the Mogul Empire in the eighteenth century, on
the Manchu empire after 1790, on
the Ottoman Empire after 1774, and on
the Tokugawa Empire after 1853 were performing the same role as the
Visigoths and the other barbarian tribes to the Roman Empire after 377.
p.12
Much of the world's history in the twentieth century has arisen from the interactions of these three factors (the continental heartland of Russian power, the shattered cultures of the Buffer Fringe of Asia, and the oceanic powers of Western Civilization).
p.15
The most important parts of Western technology can be listed under
four headings:
1. Ability to kill: development of weapons
2. Ability to preserve life: development of sanitation and medical
services
3. Ability to produce both food and industrial goods
4. Improvements in transportation and communications
p.17
After 1825 both were greatly improved by the
growth of a network of railroads, while communications were speeded by
the use of the telegraph (after 1837) and the cable (after 1850). This
"conquest of distance" was unbelievably accelerated in the twentieth
century by the use of internal-combustion engines in automobiles, air-
craft, and ships and by the advent of telephones and radio communica-
tions. The chief result of this tremendous speeding up of communica-
tions and transportation was that all parts of the world were brought
closer together, and the impact of European culture on the non-European
world was greatly intensified. This impact was made even more over-
whelming by the fact that the Transportation Revolution spread outward
from Europe extremely rapidly, diffusing almost as rapidly as the spread
of European weapons,' somewhat more rapidly than the spread of Euro-
pean sanitation and medical services, and much more rapidly than the
spread of European industrialism, European agricultural techniques, or
European ideology. As we shall see in a moment, many of the problems
which the world faced at the middle of the twentieth century were rooted
in the fact that these different aspects of the European way of life spread
outward into the non-European world at such different speeds that the
non-European world obtained them in an entirely different order from that
in which Europe had obtained them.
Transportation Revolution spread outward from Europe extremely rapidly, diffusing almost as rapidly as the spread
of
European weapons,' somewhat more rapidly than the spread of
European sanitation and medical services, and much more rapidly than the
spread of
European industrialism,
European agricultural techniques, or
European ideology.
As we shall see in a moment, many of the problems
which the world faced at the middle of the twentieth century were rooted
in the fact that these different aspects of the European way of life spread
outward into the non-European world at such different speeds that the
non-European world obtained them in an entirely different order from that
in which Europe had obtained them.
p.18
Another important example of this situation can be seen in the fact that
in Europe the Agricultural Revolution began before the Industrial Revo-
lution. Because of this, Europe was able to increase its output of food
and thus the supply of labor necessary for industrialization. But in the
non-European world (except North America) the effort to industrialize
generally began before there had been any notable success in obtaining
a more productive agricultural system. As a result, the increased supply
of food (and thus of labor) needed for the growth of industrial cities in
the non-European world has generally been obtained, not from increased
output of food so much as from a reduction of the peasants' share of the
food produced.
[[ see potatoe famine: Irish (Y), Dutch, and Sweddish famine ?? and ]]
[[ Irish migration to the North American continent (u.s.) ]]
Russia, Soviet union, China
In the Soviet Union, especially, the high speed of indus-
trialization in the period 1926-1940 was achieved by a merciless oppres-
sion of the rural community in which millions of peasants lost their lives.
The effort to copy this Soviet method in Communist China in the 1950's
brought that area to the verge of disaster.
p.18
differential diffusion rates : of two developments
the difference between :
the spread of the food-producing revolution and
the spread of the revolution in sanitation and medical services.
The most important example of such differential diffusion rates of two
European developments appears in the difference between the spread
of the food-producing revolution and the spread of the revolution in
sanitation and medical services. This difference became of such world-
shaking consequences by the middle of the twentieth century that we
must spend considerable time examining it.
[[ increased in food production => population growth => housing => population density => need for sanitation; population growth => jobs (what is job, employment, career and profession?); increased in food production without the sanitation and medical services usually result in population growth and deaths; ... ]]
p.18
In Europe the Agricultural Revolution which served to increase the
supply of food began at least fifty years before the beginnings of the
revolution in sanitation and medical services which decreased the num-
ber of deaths and thus increased the number of the population. The two
dates for these two beginnings might be put roughly at 1725 and 1775.
p.19
When the population reached a point where Europe itself could no longer feed its own people (say about 1850),
the outlying areas of the European and non-European worlds were so
eager to' be industrialized (or to obtain railroads) that Europe was able
to obtain non-European food in exchange for European industrial products. This sequence of events was a very happy combination for Europe.
p.19
the demographic explosion which began in northwestern Europe
p.19
Most stable and primitive societies, such as the American Indians before
149; or medieval Europe, have no great population problem because the
birthrate is balanced by the death rate.
pp.19─20
Most stable and primitive societies, such as the American Indians before
149; or medieval Europe, have no great population problem because the
birthrate is balanced by the death rate. In such societies both of these
are high, the population is stable, and the major portion of that population
is young (below eighteen years of age). This kind of society (frequently
called Population Type A) is what existed in Europe in the medieval pe-
riod (say about 1400) or even in part of the early modern period (say
about 1700). As a result of the increased supply of food in Europe after
1725, and of men's increased ability to save lives because of advances in
sanitation and medicine after 1775, the death rate began to fall, the birthrate remained high, the population began to increase, and the number of older persons in the society increased. This gave rise to what we have
called the demographic explosion (or Population Type B). As a result
of it, the population of Europe (beginning in western Europe) increased
in the nineteenth century, and the major portion of that population was
in the prime of life (ages eighteen to forty-five), the arms-bearing years
for men and the child bearing years for women.
At this point the demographic cycle of an expanding population goes
into a third stage (Population Type C) in which the birthrate also begins
to fall. The reasons for this fall in the birthrate have never been explained in a satisfactory way, but, as a consequence of it, there appears a new demographic condition marked by a falling birthrate, a low death rate, and a stabilizing and aging population whose major part is in the mature years from thirty to sixty. As the population gets older because of the decrease in births and the increase in expectation of life, a larger and larger part of the population has passed the years of bearing children
or bearing arms. This causes the birthrate to decline even more rapidly,
and eventually gives a population so old that the death rate begins to rise
again because of the great increase in deaths from old age or from the
casualties of inevitable senility. Accordingly, the society passes into a
fourth stage of the demographic cycle (Population Type D). This stage
is marked bv a declining birthrate, a rising death rate, a decreasing popu-
lation, and a population in which the major part is over fifty years of age.
It must be confessed that the nature of the fourth stage of this demo-
graphic cycle is based on theoretical considerations rather than on em-
pirical observation, because even western Europe, where the cycle is
most advanced, has not yet reached this fourth stage. However, it seems
quite likelv that it will pass into such a stage by the year 2000, and
already the increasing number of older persons has given rise to new
problems and to a new science called geriatrics both in western Europe
and in the eastern United States.
p.21
This shows that there has been a sequence, at intervals of about fifty
years, of four successive population pressures which might be designated
with the following names:
Anglo-French pressure, about 1850
Germanic-Italian pressure, about 1900
Slavic pressure, about 1950
Asiatic pressure, about 2000
This diffusion of pressure outward from the western European core of
Western Civilization can contribute a great deal toward a richer understanding of the period 1850-2000.
It helps to explain
the Anglo-French rivalry about 1850,
the Anglo-French alliance based on fear of Germany after 1900,
the free-world alliance based on fear of Soviet Russia after
1950, and
the danger to both Western Civilization and Soviet Civilization from Asiatic pressure by 2000.
p.22
At that time the development of weapons
had reached a point where governments could not get weapons which
were much more effective than those which private individuals could
get. Moreover, private individuals could obtain good weapons because
they had a high enough standard of living to afford it (as a result of the
Agricultural Revolution) and such weapons were cheap (as a result of
the Industrial Revolution). By 1930 (and even more by 1950) the
development of weapons had advanced to the point where governments
could obtain more effective weapons (dive-bombers, armored cars,
flamethrowers, poisonous gases, and such) than private individuals.
p.27
This change has arisen from a series of shattering experiences which have profoundly disturbed patterns of behavior and of belief, of social organizations and human hopes. Of these shattering experiences the chief were the trauma of the First world war, the long-drawn-out agony of the world depression, and the unprecedented violence of destruction of the Second world war.
p.27
To a people who believed in the innate goodness of man, in inevitable progress, in the community of interests, and in evil as merely the absence of good, the First world war, with its millions of persons dead and its billions of dollars wasted, was a blow to terrible as to be beyond human ability to comprehend.
p.27
1919─1929
the stock market crash, the world depression, the world financial crisis, and the clamor of rearmmament and aggression.
p.28
human nature is, if not innately bad, at least capable of being very evil. Left to himself, it seems today, man falls very easily to the level of the jungle or even lower, and this result can be prevented only by training and the coercive power of society. Thus, man is capable of great evil, but society can prevent this.
p.28
At the same time the view that evil is merely the absence of good has been replaced with the idea that evil is a very positive force which must be resisted and overcome. The horrors of Hitler's concentration camps and of Stalin's slave-labor units are chiefly responsible for this change.
p.28
The belief that human abilities are innate and should be left free from social duress in order to display themselves has been replaced by the idea that human abilities are the result of social training and must be directed to socially acceptable ends.
p.28
Thus liberaism and laissez-faire are to be replaced, apparently, by social discipline and planning.
p.30
Among these less sturdy traits of western Europe's great century we might mention liberalism, democracy, the parliamentary system, optimism, and the belief in inevitable progress. These were, we might say, flowers of such delicate nature that they could not survive any extended period of stormy weather. That the 20th century subjected them to long periods of very stormy weather is clear when we consider that it brought a world economic depression sandwiched between two world wars.
••••••••
Tragedy and hope : a history of the world in our time, written by Carroll Quigley, first published in 1966.
____________________________________
Charles I. Gragg sagely noted, "We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use."
"We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use."
http://www.hbs.edu/teaching/inside-hbs/
Inside the Case Method
The development of judgment and leadership, based on sound analysis rooted in facts, is a core objective of the educational process at HBS.
The case method is rooted in Harvard Business School's original vision. Edwin Gay, first Dean of HBS, called it the "problem method" and foresaw its value in creating leaders able to adjust as necessary to ever-changing business climates. From its inception a century ago, the School established two important pedagogical principles. First, it would use cases as teaching vehicles and not rely on lectures and readings. Second, it would engage the students in the learning process by getting them to teach themselves and each other. Today, although we also make use of lectures, simulations, fieldwork, and other forms of teaching as appropriate, more than 80 percent of HBS classes are built on the case method.
Judgment, based on sound analysis rooted in facts, is what our students need to absorb from their education. But, as the late HBS professor Charles I. Gragg sagely noted, "We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our knowledge and insight that we use." By applying the case method to business education, we break the boundaries of passive learning to encourage students to become active participants in their own progress. With each case, students empathize with a decision maker ("the protagonist"), analyze varied and frequently ambiguous data, and assume responsibility for an action plan that effectively resolves the case's business challenge.
"We cannot effectively use the insight of others; it must be our [group?] knowledge and insight that we use."
____________________________________
Russell L. Ackoff, Redesigning the future, 1974 [ ]
p.3
Like Rome most earlier societies that rose subsequently fell, at least partway. Not too long ago Spain was the richest and most powerful nation on earth. Later both France and England won and lost this distinctive position. Before Spain's dominance Syria, Egypt, Greece, and many other societies traveled through history like shooting stars, appearing on one horizon and disappearing on the other. Survival--let alone “thrival”--of a society is not assured by any historical law. If anything, history seems to indicate that the fall of an elevated society is inevitable. But the future is not completely contained in the past; much of it has yet to be written.
( Ackoff, Russell Lincoln, 1919-, Redesigning the future., 1. united states--social conditions--1960-., 2. social problems., 3. social change., 4. system theory., 1974, )
(Redesigning the future : a systems approach to societal problems, Russell L. Ackoff, University of Pennsylvania, 1974, p.3 )
•─ Rome
•─ Spain
•─ France and England
•─ Syria, Egypt, Greece
•─ Persia
____________________________________
Joshua Cooper Ramo (author), The seventh sense (book), 2016
p.88
Ganges River, the Mughal Empire, 16th and 17th centuries;
Yangtze and the Yellow, and the Mekong river systems, Chinese dynasties;
the Nile, Egypt;
the Euphrates, Mesopotamia;
the Mediterranean, Carthaginian, Roman, Byzantime Empires;
Great Britain.
For centuries, waterways have pulse with power. They were vital for trade, war, and national freedom.
p.88
Antoine-Henri, baron de Jomini, Napoleon's inspired tactical accomplice, was on to something when he remarked that it was the interior, networked lines of communication and logistics that had delivered victory for history's great empires. “Method changes”, Jomini observed, “but principles are unchanging.” The skeins [a string or thread from a ball of yarns] of links running inside national war machines are as essential for security as any ability to strike out ── a lesson Jomini and Napoleon expensively relearned at the end of their gasping supply lines in Russia in the winter of 1812.
p.274
But history is not only filled with baton passing: France to England to the United States. Even a casual familiarity with all of human history will remind you that there have been long periods in which a single power dominates some portion of the world. Asia, Europe, the Middle East, South America all bred nations that stretched mastery of the system for generations.
p.274
China led East Asia's order from the 1300s to the 1800s.
Assyrian imperial arrangements overmastered a dozen smaller states from the 9th to the 7th centuries BCE.
The Delhi Sultanate managed hegemony in South Asia from the 12th to the 14th centuries.
The Mughals enjoyed nearly 200 years of dominance, starting in the 16th century.
The Romans managed centuries of Mediterranean control.
p.274
political scientists Stuart Kaufman, Richard Little, and William Wohlforth
p.275
“... and Qin, with the self-strengthening reforms of Shang Yang ── economic reforms and military conscription as well as bureaucratic innovation ── developed the most penetrating and brutally effective state structure in its international system.”
Joshua Cooper Ramo (author), The seventh sense (book), 2016
____________________________________
Amy Butler Greenfield., A perfect red : empire, espionage, and the quest for the color of desire, 2005
p.197
the Spanish empire was dying, too.
After enduring Spanish rule for almost three centuries (300 years), Latin Americans had been seized by the dream of independence.
In province after province, they begun to fight for their liberty
p.201
catastrophic Mexican famine of 1785-87,
p.209
the Dutch had possessed one of the world's great empires since the 17th century, but for most of that time their interest in live cochineal had remained academic. They kept an eye out for cochineal when they explored new lands, and were delighted to seize Spanish ships carrying the dyestuff, but they never made elaborate plans to smuggle live cochineal into their dominions so they could raise it themselves. To their mind, dealing in dried cochineal was the best end of the business, and certainly the one most suited to their trading talents. In the 1600s, particularly, Dutch merchants did well for the cochineal trade, excelling in this as in so many other commercial ventures.
p.209
Netherland
p.210
Java, an island of lush rain forests and delicate temples that had been the base of Dutch power in the East Indies for two centuries.
p.210
Following the usual Dutch inclinations, in the 1600s and 1700s the Dutch East India Company had run the colony largely as a trading post; rather than running plantations themselves, company officials contracted with local Javan rulers for delivery of rice, coffee, pepper, and other commodities, which the Dutch East India Company then exported worldwide. But when the company went backrupt in 1799, control of Java had devolved directly upon the Dutch government, which concluded in the 1820s tha Java was a financial drain on the Netherlands.
p.210
At the time, Javanese peasants were already producing some of the world's most desirable exports, including rice, indigo, sugar, pepper, tobacco, cardamom, and cotton.
(A perfect red : empire, espionage, and the quest for the color of desire / Amy Butler Greenfield.──1st ed., 1. cochineal──history., 2. dyes and dyeing──textile fibers──europe──history., 3. dyes and dyeing──mexico──history., 4. cochineal insect., TP925.C63G74 2004, 667'.26──dc22, 2005, )
•─ Dutch (Netherland)
____________________________________
James C. Morgan, J. Jeffrey Morgan., Cracking the Japanese market, 1991
pp.3-4
In this sense, the Japanese should no more be faulted for their ability to read the shifting tides of the world trade than the Phoenicians or the Dutch could be faulted for the advancements they precipitated in their time. In the long run, the Japanese have discovered new global trade routes and strategies that history will look back upon favorably. In the short run, the fallout of these discoveries is painful to the United States.
(Cracking the Japanese market: strategies for success in the new global economy / James C. Morgan, J. Jeffrey Morgan., 1. marketing ―― Japan., 2. industrial management ―― Japan., 3. corporate culture ―― Japan., 4. corporations, American ―― Japan., 5. competition ―― Japan., 6. competition ―― United States., 7. Japan ―― economic conditions ―― 1989- , 8. Japan ―― economic policy ―― 1989-, HF5415.12.J3M66 1991, 658.8'0952――dc20, 1991, )
•─ Phoenicians
•─ Dutch
•─ Japan
____________________________________
constantinople : a thousand years of Byzantine history
Purnell library of knowledge
by plantagenet somerset fry, F.R.S.A.
illustrated by Denis Manton
constantinople : a thousand years of Byzantine history, [1970]
Constantinople : a thousand years of Byzantine history, by plantagenet somerset Fry, F.R.S.A., illustrated by Denis Manton, introduction by Leonard Cottrell, [1970]
p.41
silk manufacture
In 554 an event of lasting importance occurred in the empire. For centuries China had had the secret of silk manufacture and had guarded it closely.
When silks were used in Rome or Greece or Persia, or anywhere else, they had been brought at some cost from China. The price rose from time to time because of the hazards of transporting the raw materials from China to the Near east and Rome. The caravan routes developed for this purpose had to be protected by heavily armed squadrons of guards all along the roads from east to west, which extended several thousand miles. If at any time a region on the route fell into the wrong hands the difficulties of guarding increased ── and so did the cost.
pp.41─42
Justinian, [...], commissioned two monks to travel to China, ostensibly on a religious mission of charity, but actually to capture some silk cocoons. The monks bored out the tops of their walking staffs and fixed the handles into position. WHen they reached China and came across some silk-worm eggs, they popped them quickly into the hollows of the staffs.
On reaching Greece, they put the eggs on the leaves of some mulberry trees (which induce hatching of silk-worm cocoons) and the eggs hatched out. Thenceforth the manufacture of silk could be carried out locally and the cost drastically reduced. It was a revolutionary step forward in textile manufacture for the Byzantines.
p.56
the sound condition of the Byzantine economy, at least up to the terrible sack of Constantinople in 1204.
p.56
Constantinople was in the most advantageous position for trading purposes in all Europe and Asia.
p.56
For centuries Byzantine merchants almost monopolized silk manufacture outside China. They also brought, sold, exchanged and transported a greater variety of goods than did any other trading nation.
One of the main sources of wealth was transportation.
p.57
In the 9th and 10th centuries the Byzantine expanded their trading activities into the Black sea, carrying furs, fish, even slaves, from what is now Russia to Constantinople and ports in Asia Minor.
p.71
Further trade concessions were given to Venice, which only prompted other Italian sea coast states like Pisa and Genoa to demand a share. So Constantinople's trade sank, and with it sank her centuries-old financial strength.
p.71
The crusades (1096 to 1270):
1st first crusade (1096-1099)
2nd second crusade (1147-1149)
3rd third crusade (1189-1192)
4th fourth crusade (1202-1204)
5th fifth crusade (1217-1221)
6th sixth crusade (1228-1229)
7th seventh and eigth crusades (1248-54 and 1270).
p.73
In the spring of 1204 French and Venetian ships sailed up the Golden horn towards the city walls. The first assault was beaten off, but a few days later commandos managed to capture some of the gates, and soon they were inside the city. Inexplicably, the Byzantine defenders gave way with hardly a struggle. The Emperor Alexius V fled from the city into southern Greece where he was caught and executed. Constantinople fell to the invaders who now proceeded systematically to burn and loot it. The city's treasures were apportioned to the troops in accordance with their ranks.
The looting was well organized, and little remained hidden.
constantinople : a thousand years of Byzantine history
____________________________________
Richard C. Francis., Epigenetics : the ultimate mystery of inheritance, 2011
Francis, Richard C., 1953─
Epigenetics : the ultimate mystery of inheritance / Richard C. Francis. ── 1st ed.
1. genetic regulation.
2. epigenesis.
3. adaptation (biology)
QH450.F73 2011
572.8'65──dc22
2011
p.105
There were no jackasses in the United States when it was founded, yet soon they were everywhere. Where did they all come from?
p.105
At some point he heard about the amazing exploits of creatures called mules and sought to bring some over from Europe for his own scrutiny.
p.105
At the time, Spain had a near monopoly on mules, a legacy of the Moors. Actually, there was no monopoly on mules as such; Spain was willing to share mules with the world. The monopoly was on the means of producing mules, a tricky procedure, since mules are not created by conventional means, that is, by other mules. Mules are, rather, the spawn of the unnatural couplings of horses and donkeys.
p.106
So what Washington wanted wasn't a shipload of mules but one of those libidinous male donkeys, so he could make mules of his own.
p.106
For reasons obscured by the veil of time, male asses are called jacks and female asses are called jennies, while all other members of the horse family, including zebras, are called stallions and mares respectively. Hence the term jackass, its pejorative connotations deriving from the fact that donkeys of both sexes are less pliable──though by most accounts more intelligent──than horses.
p.106
Spain treated their donkeys like the Chinese did silkworms: their export was outlawed.
p.106
Mules were particularly valued for hauling and plowing, activities for which they were favored over horses because of their superior strength and sure-footedness. Despite these virtues, mules are memorialized in this country primarily for their stubbornness and ornery disposition.
p.107
Elsewhere, however, mules have been known for their physical feats──not their behavioral drawbacks──dating back to the time they were first created over three thousand years ago in the Middle East, where there was a plentiful supply of both asses and horses.
p.107
The early mule breeders also sometimes mated horse stallions with jennies, the progeny of which are called hinnies.
p.107
Hinnies, on the other hand, are much more horselike in appearance and more tractable. (Hinnies, not mules, are deployed at Disneyland to pull carriages, for example.)
Richard C. Francis makes the science understandable through stories that feature the Dutch famine of World War II, José Canseco and steriods, George Washington and the breeding of mules, X-women, nonidentical twins, a gorilla with poor parenting skills, the obesity epidemic, guinea pigs that refuse to obey Mendel's laws, and Tasmanian devils suffering from a contagious cancer.
Richard C. Francis is a freelance writer with a PhD in neurobiology and behavior from Stony Brook University. He conducted post doctoral research at the University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford University, and has published articles in academic journals in the neurosciences, evolution, and the philosophy of science. Francis is the author of Why Men Won't Ask for Directions: The Seductions of Sociobiology. Francis is also the author of chapters on the marine environments of Mexico, Belize, Brazil, Hawaii, Australia, and Thailand for The Ecotravelers' Wildlife Guides. He and his wife live in Brooklyn, New York.
(Epigenetics : the ultimate mystery of inheritance / Richard C. Francis. ── 1st ed., 1. genetic regulation., 2. epigenesis., 3. adaptation (biology), QH450.F73 2011, 572.8'65──dc22, 2011, )
____________________________________
Donald Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld's rules : leadership lessons in business, politics, war, and life, [2013].
pp.89─91
The original memo written by Lin Wells, a Pentagon policy official, succinctly summarized the unpredicable nature of great power relations:
• If you had been a security policy-maker in the world's greatest power in 1900, you would have been a Brit, looking warily at your age-old enemy, France.
• By 1910, you would be allied with France and your enemy would be Germany.
• By 1920, World war I would have been fought and won, and you'd be engaged in a naval arms race with your erst while allies, the U.S. and Japan.
• By 1930, nval arms limitation treaties were in effect, the Great depression was under way, and the defense planning standard said “no war for ten years.”
• Nine years later World war II had begun.
• By 1950, Britain no longer was the world's greatest power, the Atomic age had dawned, and a “police action” was under way in Korea.
• Ten years later the political focus was on the “missile gap”, the strategic paradigm was shifting from massive retaliation to flexible response, and a few people had heard of Vietnam.
• By 1970, the peak of our involvement in Vietnam had come and gone, we were beginning detente with the Soviets, and we were anointing the Shah as our protege in the Gulf region.
• By 1980, the Soviets were in Afghanistan, Iran was in the throes of revolution, there was talk of our “hollow forces” and a “window of vulnerability”, and the U.S. was the greatest creditor nation the world had ever seen.
• By 1990, the Soviet Union was within a year of dissolution, American forces in the desert were on the verge of showing they were anything but hollow, the U.S. had become the greatest debtor nation the world ahd ever known, and almost no one had heard of the Internet.
• Ten year later, Warsaw was the capital of a NATO nation, asymmetric threats transcended geography, and the parallel revolutions of information, biotechnology, robotics, nano technology, and high-density energy sources foreshadowed changes almost beyond forecasting.
• All of which is to say that I'm not sure what 2010 will look like, but I'm sure that it will be very little like we expect, so we should plan accordingly.2
2. Donald Rumsfeld to President George W. Bush, “Predicting the future”, April 12, 2001. Available at www.rumsfeld.com.
Donald Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld's rules : leadership lessons in business, politics, war, and life, [2013].
____________________________________
Russell L. Ackoff, Ackoff's best, 1999 [ ]
predicting the future and preparing for it (PtFaPfI)
pp.325-326
. . . .. : the type of model employed in OR (Operations Research) implies a particular paradigm of problem solving. It consists of two parts:
(1) predicting the future and
(2) preparing for it.
Clearly, the effectiveness of this approach depends critically on the accuracy with which the future can be predicted. It helps us a little, and may harm us much, to prepare perfectly for an imperfectly-predicted future.
Therefore, the paradigm of OR should be one that involves “designing a desirable future and inventing ways of bringing it about.” The future depends at least as much on what we and others do between now and then as it does on what has already happened. Therefore, we can affect it, and by collaboration with others--expanding the system to be controlled--we can increase our chances of “making it happen.” The wider the collaboration, the more closely we can approximate the future we have jointly designed. It is this perception by Fred Emery and Eric Trist that gave rise to their work in social ecology.
Prediction and preparation were the principal modalities of the Machine Age: design and invention are emerging as the principal modalities of the System Age. Prediction and preparation involve passive adaptation to an environment that is believed to be out of our control. Design and invention involve active control of a system's environment as well as the system itself.
The models currently employed by OR are evaluative in nature; they enable us to compare alternative decisions or decision rules that are “given.” In design and invention, however, the alternatives are “taken,” created. Creative solutions to problems are not ones obtained by selecting the best from among a well- or widely-recognized set of alternatives, but rather by finding or producting a new alternative. Such an alternative is frequently so superior to any of those previously perceived that formal evaluation is not required. If it is, however, then the evaluative models of OR may have a use. The challenge, therefore, is not so much to improve our methods of evaluation, but to improve our methods of design and invention.
The point of the views I have expressed up to this point is not that OR's concept of problem solving is useless, but that it should have been taken as a starting-point of OR's development, not as its end-point. To have taken it as the end-point was to have aborted OR's development and to have initiated its retreat from reality.
(Ackoff's best : his classic writings on management, Russell L. Ackoff., © 1999, pp.325-326.)
____________________________________
John Man, Ninja: 1,000 years of the shadow warrior, [2012] [2013]
p.53, pp.54-55, p.56
[page 53]
... Near anarchy started in the early fourteenth(14th) century and would last for almost three hundred years. This was the chaotic context within which the ninja evolved.
[pp.54-55]
... In the worlds of Yoshihiko Amino, one of the greatest modern historians (though little known in the West), these people formed "the wandering world," a counterpoint to the fixed world of rulers, nobles, temples, and landowners. Beyond this lay the other worlds of mountain and forest, occupied in the folklore by demons and monsters and in reality by a scattering of esoterics devoted to pilgrimages and the Shugendo training regimes described in chapter 1. Such was the rich mix that interwove with the violence in what is now central Japan, Honshu and northern Kyushu (while the northerly island of Hokkaido was so remote from all this that it might have been in a different universe).
It was not all bad. In the right circumstances, violence can stimulate as well as destroy. It happened in China's Warring States period almost two thousand years earlier, in medieval Japan, and in fifteenth-century Italy, where bitter rivalries and brutal little wars coincided with the height of the Renaissance. It seems that under the pressure of constant though less-than-total warfare, leaders also yearn for peace, creative minds struggle to make sense of life, and an obsession with war can produce equal and opposite obsessions: diplomacy, art, philosophy, poetry, trade. And it is one of the paradoxes of social evolution that peace usually has to be imposed by violence. This was certainly true of medieval Japan, where everyone expected violence and fought for peace, though each wanted it on his own terms. From such diversity no unity could come. Every special-interest group--warlords, warrior priests, Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, bandits, ninja villages--would have to be crushed or won over by any would-be leader aiming to unify Japan.
Anarchy, suspicion, and fear do strange things to minds and behavior. People took to concealing themselves with disguises and masks. Travelers wore wide-brimmed sun hats that hid their faces. Women veiled themselves. When warrior monks paraded through Kyoto in protest agaist some act or law of which they disapproved, they disguised their voices, wore masks, or wrapped their faces in shawls, cutting slits to see through (like other men of violence of recent times, in Palestine, or the Basque Country, or Northern Ireland). Things came to such a pass that when the Ashikaga seized the shogunate in 1336, they banned outlandish clothing. It didn't make much difference. People responded by adopting the fashions associated with 'hinin'--the "unhuman" pariahs who performed "unclean" tasks, such as dealing with corpses on the riverbanks, tasks that were unclean but also vital, which gave the 'hinin' a cachet despite their occupations. Riverbanks were outside the reach of any lord. [...]
All this was against a background of anarchic violence, involving every subgroup: classes, familiies, temples, landowners, city dwellers, peasants, and many more. [...]
[page 56]
... A monk writing in Harima Province (in the southwest of Honshu, part of today's Hyogo Prefecture) about the years around 1300 portrayed an area "awash in blood and fire and abounding in violence, assaults, piracy, robberies and manhunt." 1
Yet another force were the warrior monks, who had their tenth-century origins in the rivalry between two Buddhist factions with temples on Mount Hiei, near Kyoto. The two fought over land and appointment of abbots, their violent conflicts often spilling over into Kyoto itself and mixing with other wars between warlords. In 1117 an ex-emperor commented, "There are three things that are beyond my control: the rapids of the Kamo river, the dice at gambling and the monks on the Mountain" (that is, Enryaku-ji, the temple on Mount Hiei). 2 They settled into a more peaceful existence in the thirteenth(13th) century but would surface again in the fourteenth(14th), when anarchy returned and violence rose to new levels.
('Ninja: 1,000 years of the shadow warrior', John Mann, © 2012, 2013, p.53, pp.54-55, p.56)
(Man, John; 'Ninja: 1,000 years of the shadow warrior', © 2012, 2013, [344.5'48--dc23], p.53, pp.54-55, p.56)
1 Souyri, 'World Turned Upside Down', p. 106. Souyri's excellent and well-translated book is the source of much of this chapter.
2 Sansom, 'A History of Japan to 1334', p. 223. The emperor was Shirakawa (1053-1129), who entered a monastery in 1096 but remained in control for the rest of his life as "cloistered emperor." These words, though widely quoted, appeared only two centuries after Shirakawa's death. They may well be apocryphal, but most scholars agree they summarize a widely held view about the warrior monks, who in the words of the British historian George Sansom "failed miserably to provide the moral force the times demanded ... spreading disorder, corruption and bloodshed."
(Man, John 1940--; Ninja: 1,000 years of the shadow warrior and index., 1. ninja--history., 2. ninjutsu--history., [UB271.J3M36 2013], [344.5'48--dc23], ISBN 978-0-06-222202-2, copyright © 2012, 2013 by John Mann., )
____________________________________
Theodore Modis., Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future, 1992.
p.174, p.176
p.174
I was showing my observation of cyclical human behavior to Michael Royston
Michael Royston, teaching environmental sciences in the International Management Institute of Geneva
unpublished paper, written in 1982, he talked about the same fifty-six-year cycle but from another angle.5
pp.174-175
Royston's thesis: life progresses in spirals and that long-term growth follows a spiral which passes successively through four phases:
discharge,
relaxation,
charge, and
tension,
after which it returns to the starting point, but enriched with new knowledge, experience, and strength.
p.175
Figure 9.3 The Royston spiral.
Life Seen as a spiral
discharge: boom,
relaxation: recession,
charge: new order, new technology
tension: growth
p.176
floating compass (1324),
invention of gun powder and gun making (1380),
the invention of the printing press (1436),
the discovery of America (1492),
the beginning of the Reformation (Luther and Calvin, 1548),
the defeat of the Spanish and the rise of the Dutch (1604),
the arrival on France's throne of Louis XIV (1660),
the rise of the English Empire (1715), and
the American War of Independence (1772).
p.176
The fifty-six-year periods that followed these events saw successive transfer of powers,
from the French to the British with the end of the Napoleonic era (1828-1884),
from the British to the Germans with the new technologies of chemicals, automobiles, airplanes, and electronic power (1884-1940), and
from the Germans to the Americans with such new technologies as plastics, transistors, antibiotics, organic pesticides, jet engines, and nuclear power (1940-1996).
(Prediction : society's telltale signature reveals the past and forecasts the future / Theodore Modis., 1. forecasting., 2. creation (literary, artistic, etc.)., 3. science and civilization., CB 158.M63, 303.49--dc20, 1992, )
____________________________________
Thucydides wouldn’t have put it in that way, but I suspect this is what he meant when he encouraged his readers to seek “knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.”
• he [Thucydides] encouraged his readers to seek “knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it.”
source:
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35746278-on-grand-strategy
• Gaddis, J. (2018). On grand strategy . Penguin Press. U162 .G125 2018
____________________________________
John Bartlett.──17th ed., Bartlett's familiar quotations, [2002]
p.73
Thucydides3
c. 460─400 B.C.
16 With reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own impression, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labor from the want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different eyewitnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue partially for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but I shall be content if it is judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it. My history has been composed to be an everlasting possession, not the show piece of an hour.
Peloponnesian war, I, 22
3 translated by Richard Livingstone unless otherwise noted.
( Bartlett's familiar quotations : a collection of passages, phrases, and proverbs traced to their sources in ancient and modern literature / John Bartlett; edited by Justin Kaplan.──17th ed., rev. and enl., 1. quotation, English, PN6081.B27 1992, 808.88'2──dc20, 2002, )
• Thucydides, oft-cited history of Peloponnesian war between Sparta and Athens that “the present, while never repeating the past exactly, must inevitably resemble it. Hence, so must the future.”, p.219, Bina Venkataraman., The optimist's telescope : thinking ahead in a reckless age, 2019.
____________________________________
Garrett, Laurie.
The coming plague: newly emerging disease in a world out of balance / Laurie Garrett.
1. epidemiology--popular works.
2. communicable disease--popular works.
p.20
bacterium, virus, or parasite.
p.236
On the basis of historical accounts from Greece, Rome, Europe, and the post-Columbian Americas, 20th-century scholars have tried to interpret which diseases plagued ancient urban centers. For example, during the Peloponnensian War of 430 B.C. a devastating epidemic hit Athens, probably imported by returning soldiers. Thucydides said of it, “No scourge so destructive of human life is anywhere on record. The physicians had to treat it without knowing its nature, and it was among them that the greatest mortality occurred.”
It was later thought that the epidemic, which Thucydides said caused illness in every Athenian and killed up to half the population, was either typhus, the [bubonic? or pneumonic?] plague, or smallpox.7
pp.236-237
Four diseases that seemed to William McNeill and other medical historians of the 1970s to have gained particular benefit from the urban ecology over the previous 2,000 years were pneumonic plague, leprosy (Hansen's disease), tuberculosis, and syphilis. As far as could be discerned from historical records, these were rarely──if ever──seen prior to the establishment of urban societies, and all four exploited to their advantage human conditions unique to cities.
p.237
The world has experienced at least two great pandemics of bubonic/pneumonic plague, a disease caused by the Yersinia pestis bacterium──carried by fleas which resided on rodents, particularly rats. Though the bacterium has never been eradicated, ideal ecological conditions for its rapid spread among Homo sapiens occurred only a handful of times in recorded human history. Once Y. pestis got into the human bloodstream, either via a flea or rat bite or by inhalation of the bacterium, it quickly made its way into the lymphatic system. There, the bacterium killed massive numbers of cells, giving rise to formation of often grotesque pustules and pus-fillled boils. Bacteria produced in these infected sites then migrated to the liver, spleen, and brain, causing hemorrhagic destruction of the organs and demented behavior that during the Middle Ages was interpreted as intervention by Satan.
p.238
Each city would be in the grip of the disease for four or five months, until the susceptible rats and humans had died. The survivors would then face famine and economic collapse, caused by the sharp reduction in workforces.
p.574
Once infected, the animals carried the virus for life, whether or not they developed disease.
(The coming plague: newly emerging disease in a world out of balance / Laurie Garrett., 1. epidemiology--popular works., 2. communicable disease--popular works., RA651.G37 1994, 614.4--dc20, 1994, )
____________________________________
“Ducan, what if I told you that if you can leverage uncertainty and fear, you'll never be short three things: money, power, influence.”;--Cowboy Ninja Viking, 2010, AJ Lieberman, Riley Rossmo.
• “History is a wheel, for the nature of man is fundamentally
unchanging. What has happened before will perforce [ of necessity · inevitably · unavoidably ] happen again.”
── George R. R. Martin, A Feast for Crows
“Archmaester Rigney once wrote that history is a wheel,
for the nature of man is fundamentally unchanging.
What has happened before will perforce happen again,
he said.”;
── George R. R. Martin, A Feast for Crows;
Ranee Panjabi, History of Espionage, Memorial University;
Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, NL
____________________________________
Brooks, Frederick P., Jr. (Frederick Phillips)
The mythical man-month : essays on software engineering / Frederick P. Brooks, Jr. -- Anniversary ed.
includes biliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-201-83595-9
1. Software engineering
drama (mmm)
p.255
Human history is a drama in which the stories stay the same, the scripts of those stories change slowly with evolving cultures and the stage setting change all the time. So it is that we see our 20th century selves mirrored in Shakespeare, Homer, and the Bible. So to the extent The MM-M is about people and teams, obsolesence should be slow.
(The mythical man-month : essays on software engineering, Frederick P. Brooks, Jr. -- Anniversary ed., © 1985, Software engineering, p.255 )
____________________________________
Monstress
Marjorie Liu
Sana Takeda
graphic novel
volume one • awakening
Monstress
volume one
awakening
collecting
montress
issues 1 - 6
Marjorie Liu (writer)
Sana Takeda (artist)
monstress
created by
Marjorie Liu &
Sana Takeda
volume three • haven
p.61
or, as we professors teach:
what happened once, will happen again ... but in
a different form. To become a future-teller, one needs only to study history.
·‘’•─“”
____________________________________
Joshua Cooper Ramo (author), The seventh sense (book), 2016
pp.10-11
At the turn of the last century, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche suggested that humans needed a “Sixth Sense” to survive what then seemed like insane madness: the Industrial Revolution. He didn't mean by this that we should all go study history. At least that wasn't all he meant. He thought a Sixth Sense should be a feel for the rhythms of history. There was a certain pace and tone to human life, he said, sort of like a runner on a long race, and you or I would need a sense of the whole course in order to pace ourselves. Without it, we might end up slowing down at the wrong moments. Or ── and this particularly worried him ── we might run too fast and exhaust ourselves just as a big hill was coming up. Nietzsche thought the world was about to have to face a very steep, unforgiving incline on the way to a new kind of social order, and that most people in the 1890s were skipping along as if it was all downhill from there on out. A feeling for history, he hoped, might help. But he also felt pretty sure no one would develop this new sense. He expected tragedy. “The more abstract the truth you wish to teach”, he said, “the more you must allure the senses to it.” But no one was attracted to the idea of danger in those gilded days.
p.11
“Man's habit change more rapidly than his instincts”, the historian Charles Coulston Gillispie once wrote.
Joshua Cooper Ramo (author), The seventh sense (book), 2016
____________________________________
Wu, Tim
The master switch : the rise and fall of information empires / Tim Wu.
1. telecommunication--history.
2. information technology--history.
Manichaean
Man·i·chae·ism, Man·i·che·ism n.
a religious philosophy taught from the 3rd cent. to the 7th cent. A.D. by the Persian Mani, or Manichaeus, and his followers, combining Zoroastrian, Gnostic Christian, and pagan elements, and based on the doctrine of the two contending principles of good (light, God, the soul) and evil (darkness, Satan, the body): also Manichaeanism ── Manichaean n., adj. ── Manichee n.
p.273
What should be apparent to any reader having reached this point is that here in the 21st century, these firms and their allies are fighting anew the age-old battle we've recounted time and time again. It is the perennial Manichaean contest informing every episode in this book: the struggle between the partisans of the open and of the closed, between the decentralized and the consolidated visions of a proper order. But this time around, as compared with any other, the sides are far more evenly matched.
p.289
In Hindu mythology, deities and demons assume different incarnations to fight the same battles repeatedly.
[[ same shit, different band ]]
[[ same fight, different tribe ]]
p.289
It is the old conflict between the concepts of the open system and the closed, between the forces of centralized order and those of dispersed variety. The antagonists assume new forms, the general change, but essentially the same battles are fought over and over again.
pp.290-291
In 2006, Professor Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard made the startling prediction that over the next decade, the information industry would undertake a determined effort to replace the personal computer with a new generation of “information appliances.”18 He was, it turned out, exactly right.
18. These predictions form the thesis of Jonathan zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
p.293
Tom Conlon of Popular Science
The owner of an iPod or iPad is in a fundamentally different position: his machine may have far more computational power than a PC of a decade ago, but it is designed for consumption, not creation. Or, as Conlon declared vehemently, “Once we replace the personal computer with a closed-platform device such as the iPad, we replace freedom, choice and the free market with oppression, censorship and monopoly.”
pp.301-302
It is an oft-repeated assertion, but one that never-the-less always bears repeating: information industries, enterprises that traffic in form of individual expression, can never be properly understood as “normal” industries, ones dealing in virtually any other sort of commodity.* Hence, the problem if cognitive entrenchment--a problem for any part of society--is much more serious when we speak of an industry fundamental to democracy. For human, speech--in the broad constitutional sense extending beyond simple oral or even verbal communication--has effects and purposes that transcend more transactional utility.
* This point might be described as axiomatic in communications scholarship, and indeed the justification for the communications department found at many universities. It is, for example, the whole premise of Harold Innis's Empire and Communications (1950), which held, rather boldly, that the nature of various civilizations from the Egyptians onward was much the product of their communications systems.
p.302
Every one of us has read or watched something that has made an indelible impression, impossible to quantify in relation to production and distribution costs. For such a reason did Joseph Goebbels describe radio as “the spiritual weapon of the totalitarian state.” Indeed, for such reasons is there almost always, behind every political revolution or genocide, a partnership with some kind of mass medium. That kind of claim can't be made of orange juice, heating oil, running shoes, or dozens of other industries, no matter their size.
(Wu, Tim, The master switch : the rise and fall of information empires / Tim Wu., 1. telecommunication--history., 2. information technology--history., 2010 )
(The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, Tim Wu, 2010.)
____________________________________
•─ You believe that people don't actually learn from their mistakes, but rather keep repeating [their mistakes] throughout their lives.
Screenwriting for dummies, 2nd edition
by Laura Schellhardt
Adjunct professor, Northwestern university
foreword by John Logan
written by Laura Schellhardt
2008
p.164
Everyone knows the Titanic sank.
You may want to begin that film as if the audience doesn't know what happens and work your way toward the tragedy, or you may want to begin your film with the ship sinking and spend the rest of the film showing viewers how it happened.
cyclical structure:
The Titanic sinks in the first scene, we flash back to see how we get there, and we watch it sink again at the conclusion.
You believe that people don't actually learn from their mistakes, but rather keep repeating them throughout their lives.
Screenwriting for dummies, 2nd edition
by Laura Schellhardt
Adjunct professor, Northwestern university
foreword by John Logan
2008
____________________________________
"By three methods we may learn wisdom:
First, by reflection, which is noblest;
Second, by imitation, which is easiest; and
third by experience, which is the bitterest."
<look up this quote>
____________________________________
Polybius, 1979, p.80
“ I have recorded those events in the hope that the readers
of this history may profit from them, for there are two ways
by which all men may reform themselves, either by learning
from their own errors or from those of others, the former
makes a more striking demonstration, the latter a less painful
one. For this reason we should never, if we can avoid it,
choose the first, since it involves great dangers as well as
great pain, but always the seconds, since it reveals
the best course without causing us harm.
From this I conclude that the best education for
the situation of actual life consists of the experience
we acquire from the study of serious history.
For it is history alone which without causing us harm
enables us to judge what is best course in any situation or
circumstance. ”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polybius
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As Bismarck once said, “Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others' experience.”
Robert Greene, The 48 laws of power (a Joost Elffers book), 1998 [ ]
p.59
He did not understand that half of the game was keeping it quiet, and carefully watching those around him.
pp.59-60
There is another application of this law that does not require parasitic use of your contemporaries' labor: Use the past, as vast storehouse of knowledge and wisdom. Isaac Newton called this “standing on the shoulders of giants.” He meant that in making his discoveries he had built on the achievements of others. A great part of his aura of genius, he knew, was attributable to his shrewd ability to make the most of the insights of ancient, medieval, and Renaissance scientists. Shakespeare borrowed plots, characterizations, and even dialogue from Plutarch, among other writers, for he knew that nobody surpassed Plutarch in the writing of subtle psychology and witty quotes.
p.60
Writers who have delved into human nature, ancient master of strategy, historians of human stupidity and folly, kings and queens who have learned the heard way how to handle the burdens of power--their knowledge is gathering dust, waiting for you to come and stand on their shoulders.
p.60
You can slog through life, making endless mistakes, wasting time and energy trying to do things from your own experience. Or you can use the armies of the past. As Bismarck once said, “Fools say that they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by others' experience.”
(The 48 laws of power, Robert Greene (a Joost Elffers book), 1998, )
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George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the center of the storm : my years at the CIA, 2007
pp.185-186
Jami Miscik, second-most senior analyst
Paul Frandano, a Harvard-trained senior analyst with a goatee and a liking for colorful bow ties
Every Red Cell report was accompanied by a statement on the left-hand side of the front page: “In response to the events of 11 September, the Director of Central Intelligence commissioned CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence to create a ‘red cell’ that would think unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytic issues. The DCI Red Cell is thus charged with taking a pronounced ‘out-of-the-box’ approach and will periodically produce memoranda and reports intended to provoke thought rather than to provide authoritative assessment.”
George Tenet with Bill Harlow, At the center of the storm : my years at the CIA, 2007
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Ed Catmull [ ]
recorded January 31, 2007
uploaded on Jul 28, 2009
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2h2lvhzMDc
13:17
"... because they love alot of things, they were willing to put up with stuff they didn't like. And I think this is one of the fundamental problems with company: Success hides problems. It happens to alot of us in our personal lives with our health. When we are healthy, we doing alot things that are bad for us, but our health let us get away with doing stuff that are bad for us, and years later the logic doesn't hold up, but we do that. It happens with a lot of companies. It happens with states, local, and national governments. When you are healthy and you have got the resources, you don't need to address the problems. ... they were actually very healthy and very strong. The problems were there and they did not have to look at them at that time. They let the success, and they were successful at that time, they let the success get in the way of diving deep and finding the problems.";--Ed Catmull-Pixar, keep your crises small, youtube.com
14:15
22:58
that's why you need a team that works well together
we had a developement department at the time
like the studio
its a group of people looking for ideas to make into movies
we went throught this, we realizes, we're thinking about it in the wrong way
the goal of development is not to find good ideas,
it's to put together teams of people that function well together
and that changed alter the way we thought about making movie
this development department is a support group
it's a failure only if you don't learn from it
it set the way we think about things
copying is a form of learning
37:18
rather than saying, first one is not successful, what can we do to make it successful (it's a failure only if you don't learn from it)
post mortem
there is a note taker
in preparing for it
there is a hand off
just having the discussion surfaces alot of things
____________________________________
·‘’•─“”
<------------------------------------------------------------------------>
πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα
____________________________________
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(Ackoff's best : his classic writings on management, Russell L. Ackoff., © 1999, hardcover, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., p.139)
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